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The Hamilton Project seeks to advance America’s promise 
of opportunity, prosperity, and growth.
 
We believe that today’s increasingly competitive global economy 
demands public policy ideas commensurate with the challenges 
of the 21st Century. The Project’s economic strategy reflects a 
judgment that long-term prosperity is best achieved by fostering 
economic growth and broad participation in that growth, by 
enhancing individual economic security, and by embracing a role 
for effective government in making needed public investments.
 
Our strategy calls for combining public investment, a secure social 
safety net, and fiscal discipline. In that framework, the Project 
puts forward innovative proposals from leading economic thinkers 
— based on credible evidence and experience, not ideology or 
doctrine — to introduce new and effective policy options into the 
national debate.
 
The Project is named after Alexander Hamilton, the nation’s 
first Treasury Secretary, who laid the foundation for the modern 
American economy. Hamilton stood for sound fiscal policy, 
believed that broad-based opportunity for advancement would 
drive American economic growth, and recognized that “prudent 
aids and encouragements on the part of government” are 
necessary to enhance and guide market forces. The guiding 
principles of the Project remain consistent with these views.
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Abstract
Occupational licensing has been among the fastest growing labor market institutions in the United States since World War II. The 
evidence from the economics literature suggests that licensing has had an important influence on wage determination, benefits, 
employment, and prices in ways that impose net costs on society with little improvement to service quality, health, and safety. To 
improve occupational licensing practices, I propose four specific reforms. First, state agencies would make use of cost-benefit analysis 
to determine whether requests for additional occupational licensing requirements are warranted. Second, the federal government 
would promote the determination and adoption of best-practice models through financial incentives and better information. Third, 
state licensing standards would allow workers to move across state lines with a minimal cost for retraining or residency requirements. 
Fourth, where politically feasible, certain occupations that are licensed would be reclassified to a system of certification or no 
regulation. If federal, state, and local governments were to undertake these proposals, evidence suggests that employment in these 
regulated occupations would grow, consumer access to goods and services would expand, and prices would fall.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
Occupational licensure is the process by which governments establish qualifications required to practice a trade or profession, so that only licensed 
practitioners are allowed by law to receive pay for doing work 
in the occupation. This form of regulation has rapidly become 
one of the most significant factors affecting labor markets in the 
United States and other industrialized countries. In the early 
1950s less than 5 percent of U.S. workers were required to have 
a license from a state government 
in order to perform their jobs 
legally. By 2008, the share of 
workers requiring a license to 
work was estimated to be almost 
29 percent (Kleiner and Krueger 
2013). Workers often requiring 
a license include those with 
extensive formal education such 
as physicians, attorneys, nurses, 
and teachers, as well as those in 
occupations requiring less formal 
education such as truck drivers 
and hair stylists (Gittleman, Klee, 
and Kleiner 2014). In fact, in the 
early 1990s the Council of State 
Governments estimated that 
about eight hundred occupations 
were licensed by at least one state 
(Brinegar and Schmitt 1992). 
Given the pervasiveness and growth of occupational licensing, 
it has become a key issue in workers’ access to jobs, and those 
workers’ potential labor market and economic outcomes.
The main rationales for occupational licensing are to protect 
the health and safety of consumers and to ensure a sufficiently 
high level of product or service quality. By making would-
be practitioners undergo specific training, pass exams, and 
complete other requirements, according to this rationale, the 
public is better protected from fraudulent, disreputable, and 
unqualified service providers. However, not all occupations 
pose equivalent threats to health and safety. While work by 
an unskilled electrician could lead to faulty wiring and a fire 
hazard, it is hard to imagine a similar level of risk from a less 
skilled interior designer, travel guide, or auctioneer.
Moreover, the degree of occupational licensing varies widely 
across states, even for the same occupation, and it is not clear 
why some have more-restrictive requirements for entering 
the occupation than others. For example, during the 2012–
13 legislative sessions at least seven occupations were newly 
licensed in at least one state, ranging from scrap metal recyclers 
in Louisiana to body artists in the District of Columbia.1 On 
the other hand, during the same period two governors, one 
from Iowa and the other from Indiana, vetoed legislation 
from their own party’s dominated legislature that would have 
licensed several new occupations. Notably, Governor Mike 
Pence of Indiana vetoed the licensing of diabetes counselors, 
anesthesiologist assistants, and dietitians (Pence 2013). In each 
of these cases, the occupations are licensed in some states but 
not others. Even if the same occupation is licensed in multiple 
states, the requirements for licensure can vary among them. 
Furthermore, sometimes one state’s licensing regime restricts 
the provision of certain services to a specific occupation 
whereas another state allows the service to be performed by 
different occupations: for instance, nurse practitioners can 
prescribe medication in Arizona but not in Alabama (Kleiner 
et al. 2014).
In the early 1950s less than 5 percent of 
U.S. workers were required to have a license 
from a state government in order to perform 
their jobs legally. By 2008, the share of 
workers requiring a license to work was 
estimated to be almost 29 percent.
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Nevertheless, by making it more difficult to enter an 
occupation, licensing can affect employment in licensed 
occupations, wages of licensed workers, the prices for their 
services, and worker economic opportunity more broadly. 
Indeed, economic studies have demonstrated far more cases 
where occupational licensing has reduced employment and 
increased prices and wages of licensed workers than where it 
has improved the quality and safety of services (Kleiner 2013). 
These studies have shown, for example, that more-difficult 
requirements to earn a dental license (in the form of the pass 
rate of the required exam) do not lead to improved dental 
outcomes of patients but do result in higher prices of basic 
dental services, likely because the requirements result in fewer 
dentists (Kleiner and Kudrle 2000).2 Similarly, more-stringent 
licensing of mortgage brokers has no influence on the number 
of foreclosures, but does lead to higher prices of mortgages, 
again likely due to fewer providers of the service (Kleiner and 
Todd 2009).
Other studies have found that occupational licensing improves 
the employment prospects of licensed workers and can raise 
their wages by as much as 15 percent and enhance other 
benefits such as health coverage and pensions (Gittleman, 
Klee, and Kleiner 2014; Kleiner and Krueger 2013). These 
benefits are similar to those of unions (Kleiner and Krueger 
2013). However, two important distinctions between the 
effects of unions and the effects of occupational licensing are 
that union bargaining leads to higher wages by reallocating 
some of the profit income from shareholders to workers 
in unionized establishments, and it reduces variations in 
earnings. In contrast, occupational licensing transfers income 
from consumers (in the form of higher prices) to licensed 
workers (in the form of higher wages), with no apparent impact 
on reducing variations in earnings (Gittleman, Klee, and 
Kleiner 2014; Kleiner and Krueger 2013). Commensurately, 
studies have also shown that licensing reduces employment 
growth and limits job opportunities, especially for low-
income individuals; the additional requirements needed to 
earn licensure may steer these workers into lower-paying but 
more-accessible jobs (Carpenter et al. 2012; Kleiner 2006). In 
fact, standard economic models imply that the restrictions 
from occupational licensing can result in up to 2.85 million 
fewer jobs nationwide, with an annual cost to consumers of 
$203 billion (Kleiner, Krueger, and Mas 2011).3 In addition, 
evidence suggests that occupational licensing can result 
in a loss in overall output of about 0.1 percent of annual 
consumption expenditures (Kleiner 2006).
Overall, current research shows many cases in which 
there are limited benefits of occupational regulation for 
consumers. There is little evidence to show that the licensing 
of many different occupations has improved the quality of 
services received by consumers, although in many cases it 
has increased prices and limited economic output. The goal 
of this discussion paper is to present proposals to reform 
occupational licensing policies in the United States that would 
foster greater opportunities for job growth and economic 
prosperity, and lower costs for consumers. These proposals 
focus on developing cost-benefit analysis of occupational 
licensing, on the federal government providing incentives to 
the states for regulatory innovation, on reducing barriers to 
interstate migration, and on suggestions for movements to 
less-restrictive forms of occupational regulation.
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Chapter 2. The Landscape of Occupational Regulation
Throughout much of the nineteenth century there was little occupational licensing in the United States (Langford 2009). In the later part of that century, 
with greater urbanization and less knowledge about the skills 
of the growing number of service providers, states began 
passing occupational licensing statutes for occupations such as 
physicians, dentists, pharmacists, and attorneys (Kleiner 2006). 
In 1882 the state of West Virginia passed a law regulating the 
practice of physicians (§§ 9 and 15, chapter 93, 1882), which 
certain physicians subsequently challenged. A resulting 
Supreme Court case, Dent v. West Virginia (1889), established 
the right of states to require licenses for certain occupations, 
and more broadly established state law as the appropriate 
venue to deal with protecting the health, welfare, or safety 
of citizens.4 Unlike federal legislation, such as the National 
Labor Relations Act passed in 1935, which dealt with collective 
bargaining, Dent v. West Virginia gave to the states the police 
powers to regulate occupations (Gross 1984). This case largely 
took away the right for the federal government to preempt state 
law in the arena of occupational licensing.
After Dent v. West Virginia there was a steady increase in 
the regulation of occupations in the United States, with 
thirty occupations licensed by 1920, including more than 
2,800 statutory provisions in the different states (Greene 
1969). At the beginning of the twentieth century, physicians, 
dentists, and lawyers in most states were required to obtain 
a license before they could practice. Following World War II 
the number of licensed occupations continued to expand as 
more occupations became well organized (Council of State 
Governments 1952). Much of this growth has come from 
medical services: about 76 percent of non-physician health-
service providers must have a license in order to work (Kleiner 
et al. 2014). However, despite the rationale for public health 
and safety, the rise of licensing for the vast majority of licensed 
occupations has come mainly at the behest of professional 
BOX 1. 
The Case of Uber and Taxi Driver Licensing
The growth of information technology in recent years, especially mobile devices, has allowed consumers and service providers 
to connect with each other with increasingly detailed levels of information about each party, in ways that challenge the 
traditional role of occupational licensing. Users of Uber, an app-based transportation network and taxi company, have the 
ability to directly contact suppliers of these services and to access information about the driver. Customers and drivers rate 
each other immediately after a trip; potential customers and drivers can access this information so that their quality can be 
evaluated. The drivers, who function as independent contractors, are vetted through the company and have private driver’s 
licenses, but, unlike most taxi drivers, Uber does not require them to have a taxi or chauffeur’s license through the state, county, 
or city. Consequently, they do not pay these licensing fees to the government, and Uber is not subject to other regulations of 
taxis, such as metered fares and guaranteed coverage of certain destinations.
In essence, Uber drivers perform a function very similar to a licensed occupation—taxi driver—but are not themselves 
commercially licensed; the law to date is murky on the legality of Uber. Many customers seem to enjoy the benefits of 
competition with conventional taxis, such as the chance of lower prices, and in some cities Uber drivers almost serve as the 
family chauffeur (Kapp 2014). On the other hand, taxi companies and drivers and government officials have expressed public 
safety concerns about Uber’s lack of regulation, with some cities, including Portland, Oregon, attempting to ban Uber drivers 
in the city. Moreover, the increased competition among driving services as a result of car-service apps including Uber has led 
to declining prices for taxi medallions—licenses that many cities require before an individual is allowed to operate a taxi—and 
a stalling of medallion sales. As an example, New York City’s individual taxi medallions have decreased in price by 23 percent 
between 2013’s peak and the beginning of 2015 (Barro 2015).
The fate of Uber and similar services, even as they continue to grow, will likely be determined through court battles and, 
potentially, legislation.
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associations, not consumer advocacy or public interest groups 
(Kry 2000, 888). Licensing rules brought about in this manner 
often “grandparent” current practitioners and allow them to 
practice without their having to meet the new requirements, 
suggesting that licensing criteria are not imposed solely with 
the health and safety of consumers in mind. There are some 
cases where a government entity imposed regulation, usually 
as a result of perceived corruption. For example, stockbrokers 
were brought under federal regulation in response to the 
financial scandals that grew out of the crash of the stock 
market in 1929 and subsequent depression (Gellhorn 1976).
By 2003 the Council of State Governments estimated that more 
than 1,100 occupations were licensed, certified, or registered 
in at least one state (Council on Licensure, Enforcement, 
and Regulation [CLEAR] 2004). In contrast to occupational 
licensing, the process of certification permits any person 
to legally perform the relevant tasks, but the government—
or sometimes a private, nonprofit agency—administers an 
examination and certifies those who have achieved the requisite 
level of skill and knowledge. For instance, in many states travel 
agents and car mechanics are certified but not licensed. This 
process allows for competition for services, as anyone can legally 
perform the work, but it protects the right of the title for those 
in the occupation. For example, only workers who have passed 
through a Chartered Financial Analyst program and exam can 
use that title, but others can provide financial advice for a fee as 
long as they do not use the title “chartered financial analyst.” 
Registration is even less restrictive, and means that workers in 
an occupation must apply to be on an official roster maintained 
by a government agency. 
It is difficult to ascertain exactly what share of workers are 
required to have a license (or are certified) to do their jobs, 
or how this share varies across states or different periods, 
since government surveys have not tracked this information. 
In 2013, however, Harris Poll Interactive conducted such 
a survey for the Institute for Justice of approximately ten 
thousand workers (Kleiner and Krueger 2013; Kleiner and 
Vorotnikov 2015; also see the appendix). This poll found that 
28.4 percent of the respondents said they were either licensed 
or certified in their current jobs. Approximately a quarter of 
this group stated that the work functions in their occupation 
could be legally performed by individuals without a license 
(that is, they meet the definition of government certification). 
Including respondents who said that individuals who worked 
in their occupation did not require a license currently but 
would eventually require one raises the total share of workers 
that are or eventually must be licensed or certified by a 
government to 30.2 percent.5 
The Harris poll also asked workers what types of requirements 
they needed to meet to achieve their license or certification (see 
table 1). Just over three-quarters of licensed workers reported 
a high school diploma was necessary, and nearly half said a 
college degree was necessary. Almost 90 percent reported 
the need to pass an exam, and many reported necessary 
continuing education and internships. These requirements 
are only slightly less demanding for certified, rather than 
licensed, workers.
The share of the workforce that is licensed or certified varies 
considerably across states, as shown in table 2. The table 
reports state-level estimates of occupational licensing and 
certification, using data from the same Harris poll. Iowa 
(33.3%) leads the country as the state with the highest share of 
its workforce licensed, while South Carolina (12.4%), Rhode 
Island (14.5%), New Hampshire (14.7%), and Indiana (14.9%) 
TABLE 1. 
Requirements for Becoming Licensed or Certified
Requirement Share of licensed workers facing requirement (percent)
Share of certified workers facing 
requirement (percent)
High school diploma 75.1 66.6
College degree 47.7 28.5
Passing an exam 88.9 85.9
Passing a performance test 67.8 61.1
Continuing education 67.8 52.9
Internship 46.5 35.3
License/certificate renewal test 34.5 33.9
Source: Kleiner and Vorotnikov (2015), based on an analysis of data from a Harris poll of 9,850 individuals conducted in the first half of 2013.
Note: Individuals age eighteen or older who were employed or looking for a job were eligible respondents. Kleiner and Vorotnikov limited their analysis to individuals who at the time of the survey 
were either currently employed or had been employed during the previous twelve months.
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TABLE 2. 
Share of Workforce Licensed or Certified, by State
State Share of workforce licensed (percent)
Share of workforce 
certified (percent)
Alabama 20.9 6.9
Alaska 25.5 7.3
Arizona 22.3 8.7
Arkansas 20.2 5.3
California 20.7 6.1
Colorado 17.2 7.4
Connecticut 24.7 8.8
Delaware 15.3 3.5
District of 
Columbia
19.7 6.9
Florida 28.7 4.2
Georgia 15.7 5.9
Hawaii 26.6 11.3
Idaho 22.8 8.4
Illinois 24.7 5.0
Indiana 14.9 10.8
Iowa 33.3 5.1
Kansas 14.9 5.6
Kentucky 27.8 10.7
Louisiana 22.3 9.9
Maine 20.7 7.8
Maryland 17.2 4.8
Massachusetts 21.3 3.9
Michigan 20.6 3.3
Minnesota 15.0 3.4
Mississippi 23.1 7.2
Missouri 21.3 5.4
State Share of workforce licensed (percent)
Share of workforce 
certified (percent)
Montana 21.3 8.3
Nebraska 24.6 8.3
Nevada 30.7 5.4
New Hampshire 14.7 4.1
New Jersey 20.7 11.3
New Mexico 25.9 7.3
New York 20.7 5.5
North Carolina 22.0 8.4
North Dakota 26.6 2.6
Ohio 18.1 7.5
Oklahoma 25.0 7.2
Oregon 26.1 3.8
Pennsylvania 20.2 7.6
Rhode Island 14.5 11.9
South Carolina 12.4 3.5
South Dakota 21.8 5.6
Tennessee 23.1 4.2
Texas 24.1 3.7
Utah 23.8 5.9
Vermont 16.8 6.5
Virginia 17.2 3.7
Washington 30.5 7.2
West Virginia 25.8 12.3
Wisconsin 18.4 1.9
Wyoming 21.2 10.1
Source: Kleiner and Vorotnikov (2015), based on an analysis of data from a Harris poll of 9,850 individuals conducted in the first half of 2013 (Harris Poll Interactive 2013). 
Note: Individuals age eighteen or older who were employed or looking for a job were eligible respondents. Kleiner and Vorotnikov limited their analysis to individuals who at the time of the survey 
were either currently employed or had been employed during the previous twelve months.
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TABLE 3. 
Number of States that License Lower-Income Occupations, by Select Occupations
Occupations with Lowest Number of States  
Requiring a License
Occupation Number of States that License
Dental Assistant 7
Tree Trimmer 7
Upholsterer 7
Social and Human Service Assistant 7
Packager 7
Sheet Metal Contractor (Residential) 7
Title Examiner 6
HVAC Contractor (Residential) 5
Shampooer 5
Psychiatric Technician 4
Interior Designer 4
Cross-connection Survey Inspector 4
Court Clerk 4
Home Entertainment Installer 3
Dietetic Technician 3
Electrical Helper 2
Nursery Worker 2
Log Scaler 2
Psychiatric Aide 2
Still Machine Setter 2
Pipelayer Non-contractor 1
Conveyor Operator 1
Florist 1
Fire Sprinkler System Tester 1
Forest Worker 1
Occupations with Highest Number of States  
Requiring a License
Occupation Number of States that License
Pest Control Applicator 51
Emergency Medical Technician 51
School Bus Driver 51
Bus Driver (City/Transit) 51
Vegetation Pesticide Handler 51
Truck Driver 51
Cosmetologist 51
Skin Care Specialist 50
Manicurist 50
Barber 50
Preschool Teacher 49
Earth Driller 47
Athletic Trainer 46
Fisher 41
General/Commercial HVAC Contractor 40
Massage Therapist 39
Mobile Home Installer 39
Veterinary Technologist 37
Security Guard 37
Make-up Artist 36
Door Repair Contractor 35
Security Alarm Installer 34
Fire Alarm Installer 34
Milk Sampler 34
Child Care Worker 33
Auctioneer 33
Source: Institute for Justice (2012).
Note: Lower-income occupations refer to occupations whose average income fell below the national average income.
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are the states with the smallest shares of their workforce 
licensed. West Virginia (12.3%) and Rhode Island (11.9%) 
have the highest percentage of certified workers. In contrast, 
Wisconsin (1.9%) and North Dakota (2.6%) have the lowest 
percentage of certified workers.
Because the use of occupational licensing varies across states 
for the same occupation, the large variations in licensing 
requirements suggest that this form of regulation is not 
always strictly related with safety or quality concerns over 
individuals’ ability to do the tasks related to the occupation 
(Carpenter et al. 2012). For example, only seven states license 
dental assistants and thirteen states license locksmiths. Even 
for states that do license the same occupation, the requirements 
to obtain a license can vary widely. Iowa requires 490 days of 
education and training to become a licensed cosmetologist, 
but the national average is 372 days, and New York and 
Massachusetts require only 233 days (Carpenter et al. 2012). 
Training requirements also are frequently unrelated to issues 
of health and public safety. To illustrate, training requirements 
in Michigan take 1,460 days for an athletic trainer, but only 
twenty-six days for an emergency medical technician. These 
examples provide some illustrations of the variance in the 
training required of licensed workers across states and the 
licensing of occupations within states. Table 3 lists some of the 
lower-income occupations that are most and least frequently 
licensed.
Although these differences in occupational regulation across 
states may in part reflect differing mixes of industry and 
human capital characteristics, they may also reflect the ability 
of occupational associations to lobby successfully for licensing 
requirements in order to limit competition for their workers. 
In a rational occupational licensing system, for example, it is 
difficult to justify why Iowa would have twice the percentage 
of licensed workers as South Carolina, Rhode Island, New 
Hampshire, or Indiana. As discussed in the following section, 
these differences are rarely related to service quality or public 
safety, but they do have important implications for worker 
opportunity, prices, and access to these services.
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Chapter 3. The Challenge
Although originally motivated by concerns over public health and safety, the regulation of many occupations often can limit worker opportunity more than it 
protects consumers. Economic studies have found little impact 
of occupational licensing on service quality in occupations 
that are not widely licensed; even in occupations that are 
widely licensed, studies have found few impacts of tougher 
requirements for licensing on health measures or quality 
outcomes. In contrast, many of the same studies have found 
occupational licensing to affect wages, employment, and 
benefits (Gittleman, Klee, and Kleiner 2014; Kleiner and Krueger 
2010, 2013; Kleiner and Todd 2009). Most of the literature has 
shown that licensing is beneficial for those fortunate enough or 
able to obtain a license, and that these benefits come mainly at 
the expense of consumers, who are confronted with reduced 
availability of services and higher prices (Cox and Foster 1990; 
Kleiner 2006). Policy makers need to examine and determine 
whether these increases in economic status to licensed workers 
are a result of increased quality caused by greater training that 
result in higher-quality services, or whether they are a result of 
restricted competition through the limiting of entry into the 
occupations, or both.
INFLUENCE OF OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING ON 
QUALITY OF SERVICES
Many research studies have attempted to develop methods of 
estimating the influence of licensing on quality or the demand 
for licensed services. On this issue there are a disproportionate 
number of studies on regulation in dentistry. In part this 
is because for many years dentistry had large variations 
in state licensing requirements and unique state-specific 
requirements: an example is the gold foil procedure for filling 
teeth that was required in California, but in no other state 
(Kleiner 2006). Moreover, it was easy to identify and quantify 
outcome measures such as the number of cavities. While an 
early study (Holen 1978) found that stricter licensing reduced 
the likelihood of adverse outcomes, such as number of cavities, 
or broken or chipped teeth, more-recent studies that control 
for additional economic, demographic, and statutory factors 
for the individuals and states represented find no impact of 
tougher state licensing laws and administrative procedures 
on measures of dental condition (Carroll and Gaston 1981; 
Kleiner and Kudrle 2000). This finding suggests that stricter 
occupational licensing in dentistry—based on observed 
differences across states—generally has little to no effect on 
outcomes, even when outcomes are measured directly at 
the point of service. Among other health-care occupations, 
evidence of positive quality impacts from occupational 
regulation has been similarly scant. An early field study 
conducted by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) on optical 
care found that the average quality of eye care examinations 
is lower in regions with restrictions on the advertising of 
optometry services (Kwoka 1984). In addition, the price of 
these eye exams was found to be lower when advertising was 
permitted.
It is difficult to demonstrate quality impacts in non-health-
related occupations. In another early field study, the FTC 
examined the relationship between licensing and service 
quality for television repair (Phelan 1974). In this study, 
researchers used televisions with known defects to measure 
the quality of repair services in three locations: Washington, 
DC, which had no licensing of TV repair; New Orleans, 
which licensed the individual worker; and San Francisco, 
which licensed the facility but not the individual. One of the 
findings was that the licensing of individuals in Louisiana (the 
Louisiana Licensing Law) did not protect the consumer from 
parts fraud (the use of substandard repair parts). Researchers 
found parts fraud in about 20 percent of the repair attempts 
in San Francisco, compared to about 50 percent in both New 
Orleans and Washington, DC.
Rigorous studies of other occupations, from construction 
contractors to florists to teachers, suggest that tougher forms of 
regulation have ambiguous effects at best on the quality or the 
demand for the service. In the case of building contractors, for 
example, allowing lower-quality contractors to obtain licenses 
tends to reduce the quality-enhancing impacts of licensure 
(Maurizi 1980), which would suggest licensing can modestly 
improve quality in some circumstances. On the other hand, a 
field experiment found that licensed florists in Louisiana (the 
only state to license florists) did not produce better-quality 
floral arrangements than their unlicensed counterparts in 
Texas. However, the floral arrangements in Louisiana cost 
more for the same product and service than those in Texas 
(Carpenter 2011). With regard to teachers, especially rigorous 
studies have found the growth of occupational licensing in 
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that occupation over the past two decades has not measurably 
affected most students’ test scores, which are a generally 
recognized (if imperfect) indicator of quality in education 
(Angrist and Guryan 2003; Kleiner and Petree 1988). A 
subsequent study was more nuanced, showing that in wealthier 
school districts stricter teacher licensing was associated with 
higher scores on standardized tests; however, in lower-income 
districts the degree of teacher licensing did not appear to 
be related to student test scores at all (Larsen 2012). Earlier 
studies covering a range of widely varying but professional 
licensed occupations found that 
licensing had either a negative 
impact or no influence on the 
quality of services received by 
consumers (Carroll and Gaston 
1981). Collectively, these studies 
indicate that occupational 
licensing as it is commonly 
practiced may not improve 
consumer protection.
Overall, few studies have 
shown significant benefits of 
occupational regulation on the 
quality of service received by 
consumers or on the demand 
for the service. Although policy 
makers may wish occupational 
licensing were a way to enhance 
quality, there is little evidence 
to support this assumption for 
consumers, even at the point of 
sale. On the other hand, several studies have found significant 
effects on the wages that licensed practitioners receive and on 
the prices that consumers face.
INFLUENCE OF OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING ON 
WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT
According to recent research, working in a universally licensed 
occupation appears to increase hourly earnings by between 10 
to 15 percent relative to unlicensed individuals with similar 
education and skills; this magnitude is only slightly smaller 
than that of other labor market institutions such as unions 
(Gittleman, Klee, and Kleiner 2014; Kleiner and Krueger 
2010, 2013). For individuals working in an occupation that is 
licensed in some states and not in others, the impact of being 
licensed is much smaller, about 5 to 8 percent (Gittleman, Klee, 
and Kleiner 2014; Gittleman and Kleiner 2014; Kleiner 2006). 
These studies also find that the wage benefits of licensing are 
concentrated primarily among individuals who are already 
in relatively well-paying occupations (Gittleman, Klee, and 
Kleiner 2014). For occupations associated with both higher 
education and higher income and that are mainly in the 
private sector, such as physicians, dentists, and attorneys, 
licensing appears to have large effects by limiting entry or 
making it more difficult for an individual to be hired for a job 
in another state. However, for other occupations, including 
teachers, nurses, and cosmetologists, the impact of licensing 
on earnings is murky, with some studies finding small effects 
and others finding none (Kleiner 2006, 2013). The influence 
of occupational licensing on employment growth takes place 
more gradually, but research findings suggest that states that 
license a certain occupation experience slower employment 
growth in that occupation relative to the same occupation 
in states that do not require a license (Kleiner 2006). To see 
how occupational licensing can lead to slower employment 
growth in the long term, consider the following: States often 
enact grandparent clauses that protect existing workers, and 
new entrants must have higher entry standards than existing 
members of the occupation. The process of older, less-educated 
workers leaving, and newer workers with higher entry 
requirements entering takes time to work its way through 
the labor market. This process may limit the supply of labor 
and allow those currently in the occupation to gain economic 
benefits by limiting employment growth.
INFLUENCE OF OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING ON 
GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY
Although occupational licensing may effectively boost wages 
for some occupations, licensed workers are not always better 
off. Both theory and empirical evidence indicate that licensing 
can hamper mobility, making it harder for workers to take 
advantage of job opportunities in other states. Occupational 
licensing can act as a deterrent to geographical movements in 
Evidence suggests that relicensing policies 
impose costs on workers looking for 
jobs they want in another state, 
reducing their ability to earn a living.
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several ways. For instance, because licensing is typically done 
at the state level, the worker often must repeat many of the 
requirements and investments necessary to gain licensure in 
another state. These requirements sometimes involve meeting 
qualification criteria such as having good moral character, 
passing exams, working with or for local practitioners, and in 
many cases engaging in continuing professional development 
activities (an investment that continues throughout the 
worker’s career). In the absence of reciprocity agreements—in 
which one state accepts an occupational license granted by a 
partner state—relicensure requirements can be prohibitive, 
in terms of both time and money, and so discourage workers 
from moving to a different state.
More generally, evidence suggests that relicensing policies 
impose costs on workers looking for jobs they want in another 
state, reducing their ability to earn a living. This has become 
a particularly important issue for military families who are 
often moved across state lines. The situation arises when 
trailing partners, if they are licensed in one state, have to seek 
reaccreditation in a second state at considerable cost in both 
time and money. This phenomenon was recently highlighted 
in a report by the U.S. Executive Office of the President (2013).
Several studies have corroborated the negative link between 
occupational licensing and worker mobility. Some of this 
literature is from the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s and focuses 
on the occupations then heavily licensed, such as dentists, 
physicians, and attorneys (Holen 1965; Kleiner, Gay, and 
Greene 1982; Pashigian 1979). However, evidence that is more 
recent confirms and extends the earlier findings to lower-
earning occupations. For example, licensing for attorneys still 
affects their cross-state migration rates and earnings (Tenn 
2001). The regulation of manicurists, who are commonly 
licensed although associated requirements are variable in 
different states, can impede cross-state and even international 
migration—particularly of manicurists from Vietnam. (Forty-
two percent of all manicurists in the United States in 2000 were 
Vietnamese.) In particular, a well-regarded study finds that the 
requirement of an additional one hundred hours of training 
reduces the likelihood of having a Vietnamese manicurist in 
the area by 4.5 percentage points, while the requirement of 
some level of English proficiency reduces that likelihood by 
5.7 percentage points (Federman, Harrington, and Krynski 
2006). In other words, policies that affect migration are not 
limited to high-income individuals.
BOX 2. 
Comparisons and Lessons from the European Union
Occupational licensing is not unique to the United States. Based on information gathered in 2012 from the then twenty-
seven nations in the European Union (EU), between 9 and 24 percent of European workers are subject to occupational 
licensing, which translates to between 19 million and 51 million individuals. These estimates of the share of the workforce 
that is licensed, even at the higher end, are still lower than the estimated share in the United States, which is slightly under 
30 percent (Koumenta et al. 2014).
Similar to U.S. states, the extent of occupational licensing varies widely across countries in the EU: Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Romania, and Sweden all have less than 15 percent 
of their workers covered by occupational licensing (Koumenta et al. 2014). Regulation is much more prevalent in other 
countries, however: at least 25 percent of the workforce in Denmark and Germany, for example, is regulated, and rates are 
also high in Italy and Spain.
In an effort to promote job growth, Poland’s government in October 2011 presented an ambitious agenda of deregulating 
access to many of the nation’s professions. The country is currently in this process, and by the end of 2015 the government 
plans to have liberalized access to about 250 of the 380 currently regulated professions (Kleiner and Lachowska 2014). The 
prime minister’s office (Prime Minister’s Office [Poland] 2012) has stated that liberalizing access is expected to have the 
following consequences:
1. There will be higher employment due to the removal of barriers to entering the regulated professions. In fact, the 
prime minister’s office has stated, “According to expert estimates, deregulation may increase employment within the 
[occupations] concerned by 15–20 percent” (Poland Prime Minister’s Office 2012).
2. There will be lower prices and better quality of services in the sectors that deregulate access to professions.
3. Administrative costs will be lower than the costs of maintaining the current regulatory system.
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This lack of mobility not only can have detrimental effects on 
workers, but also can harm consumers—especially in rapidly 
growing areas. To the extent that licensing slows both the 
influx of new workers and greater competition, consumers 
are not able to take advantage of services at the lowest cost 
(Moretti 2012). Taken together, these studies support the view 
that regulation may limit the number of practitioners and 
that a policy of reducing barriers to migration could provide 
benefits to workers and consumers. 
INFLUENCE OF OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING ON 
PRICES
Occupational licensing can affect prices through several 
channels, from restrictions on interstate mobility of workers 
to limitations on advertising and other commercial practices 
(Bond et al. 1980; Feldman and Begun 1978; Shepard 1978). The 
impact on prices of licensing-related practices ranges from 5 
to 33 percent, depending on the type of occupational practice 
and location (Kleiner 2006).6 For example, the influence of 
the lack of reciprocity in dentistry raises prices by 15 percent 
(Shepard 1978). A restriction on the number of hygienists that 
a dentist may employ increases the average price of a dental 
visit by 7 percent (Liang and Ogur 1987). Restrictions on the 
tasks a nurse practitioner can provide without the supervision 
of a physician raises prices of well-child exams by 10 percent, 
with no effect on child mortality or insurance rates for 
malpractice (Kleiner et al. 2014).
These higher prices could be the result of government 
regulations reducing the likelihood of poor service, or lemons, 
in the market (Akerlof 1970). The rationale is that higher prices 
cause the consumers to perceive the service to be of higher 
quality (even if this is not actually the case) and demand more 
of the service, which drives up the price. On the other hand, 
regulations could be a way for current practitioners to raise 
their own wages by limiting entry or restricting information 
on prices in the market for the service (health care is a 
prime example of such use of regulations) (Friedman 1962; 
Kleiner 2014). Under this framework, occupational licensing 
functions as if the government were granting a monopoly in 
the market for the service, with the long-term impacts being 
lower-quality services, too few providers, and higher prices. It 
is difficult to tell from the empirical studies of licensing which 
of these causes is more likely. However, regardless of the exact 
cause, it is possible for regulated high-income occupations, 
such as dentists and attorneys, to raise prices in a way that 
may further shift income from lower-income customers to 
higher-income practitioners, possibly contributing to greater 
income inequality. In particular, if wealthier consumers place 
greater value (or can afford) the higher quality brought by 
licensure, then lower-income individuals with less demand (or 
less ability to pay) for higher quality might lose from tougher 
licensing standards by having less access to the service and at a 
higher price (Kleiner and Kudrle 2000; Shapiro 1986).
An alternative explanation for these price increases that the 
occupations’ professional associations often give is that the 
method of delivering services for the profession has changed 
over time, and that allowing a group of experts to supervise, 
govern, and recommend changes would standardize the 
practices and reduce uncertainty in the minds of consumers. 
For example, by having better dentists through more training, 
the patient is likely to receive better care, but at a higher 
price. Furthermore, capital expenditures in the form of more-
sophisticated and more-expensive equipment have increased 
the required return on investment both for sole practitioners 
BOX 3. 
The Case of Dentists vs. Teeth Whiteners
In the Supreme Court case North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission, argued in 
October 2014, the dental licensing board of North Carolina claimed that individuals who were not dentists who sold over-
the-counter tooth whitening kits in malls and salons were practicing dentistry without an occupational license.7 When the 
dental board sent cease-and-desist letters to these teeth whitening service providers and distributors of teeth whitening 
products and equipment, the FTC viewed the board’s action as a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. During the 
oral arguments at the Supreme Court, Associate Justice Breyer expressed concern about bureaucrats making decisions in 
areas where only trained professionals are knowledgeable and have competence in making appropriate decisions (Liptak 
2014). Although a regulatory board consisting of licensed practitioners possesses specific knowledge of the tasks needed 
to perform the job, such a board can lead to perverse incentives in which the interests of the practitioners are in conflict 
with the interests of the public. In North Carolina six of the eight board members were practicing dentists elected by other 
practicing dentists, and were not chosen by the governor, legislature, or other officials responsible to the public. While the 
dentists have an interest in exclusively reserving the right to sell a profitable service, the public has an interest in there 
being a sufficient number of individuals to do the job at a reasonable price and at an acceptable quality. This Supreme 
Court case, whose decision is pending as of this writing, provides an illustration of how occupational regulation can lead 
to conflicts over who can legally provide services to the public. 
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and for large-scale providers of medical services (Cutler and 
Berndt 2001). On the other hand, standardization through 
occupational licensing may also stifle innovation by not 
allowing the introduction of new procedures or competitors 
because they do not accord with standard procedures 
established by a licensing board. Some have argued, for 
example, that chief executive officers or members of the 
board of directors of large corporations should be licensed 
(Freeman 2008). Although this could in some cases reduce 
problems related to ethical behavior or enhance skills, it 
could also reduce innovation by fencing out entrepreneurial 
individuals who do not have extensive formal education. 
Neither Bill Gates nor Steve Jobs, for instance, graduated 
from college and so would not be eligible for licensing of 
executives under proposed educational requirements, but 
they nonetheless enhanced innovation, creativity, and the 
quality of information technology through their technical 
and managerial skills. They also greatly enhanced access to 
numerous consumer products.
THE NET EFFECTS OF OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING
With little published research on the relationship between 
performance on an occupational licensing exam and an 
individual’s ability to perform the job safely at a high-quality 
level, there is no assurance that the quality of services received 
by consumers necessarily improves when government places 
additional requirements on the providers of those services. 
TABLE 4. 
A Comparison of Licensing Practices for Dental Occupations in North Carolina and Colorado
North Carolina Colorado
The profession and one public member elect members of the 
licensing board.
The governor selects members of the licensing board.
Professional members of the board investigate misconduct  
and the authority to perform specific tasks.
Independent investigators investigate misconduct and the authority 
to perform specific tasks.
The state’s attorney general does not represent the board. The state’s attorney general represents the board.
Board actions are not necessarily guided by evidence gathered  
and analyzed by a regulatory agency.
Board actions are guided by evidence gathered and analyzed  
by a regulatory agency.
Source: Data provided by Lauren Larson, Director, Division of Professions and Occupations, Department of Regulatory Agencies (DORA), State of Colorado; data provided via email on  
January 2, 2015.
Yet these requirements can be costly: even for occupations 
with fewer education requirements, such as cosmetology, job-
specific training can take longer than one year and include 
an apprenticeship followed by a state licensing exam. These 
requirements may result in fewer practitioners, especially 
in lower-income occupations, and higher prices, thereby 
resulting in reduced access to the services. The net effects can 
be regressive, as lower-income consumers—who now have to 
pay higher prices and may have less access to services ranging 
from haircuts to dental exams—pay more to the regulated 
practitioners, some of whom are well compensated.
The economic costs of occupational licensing have generated 
calls, from both sides of the political spectrum, to rethink 
the system. In 2014 the Republican chairperson and the 
Democratic ranking member of a House subcommittee 
agreed that occupational licensing deserves greater scrutiny 
(Vinik 2014). Moreover, as table 4 shows, states like North 
Carolina and Colorado have varying policies on implementing 
occupational licensing practices within their states, which may 
lead to different outcomes for practitioners and consumers. 
Given this situation, I put forth a set of proposals with the goal 
of systematizing and harmonizing occupational regulation 
in order to promote lower consumer prices, better access to 
services, and growth in employment, while minimizing harm 
to public health and to the economic well-being of certain 
regulated workers.
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Chapter 4. The Proposal
Given the costs of occupational licensing to the economy and the inconsistency and variability of licensing across states, I am proposing four policy changes 
that would both reduce the regulatory costs of occupational 
licensing among the states and enhance employment and the 
services provided to consumers. 
1. State agencies would make use of cost-benefit analysis to 
determine whether requests for additional occupational 
licensing requirements are warranted. 
2. The federal government would promote the determination 
and adoption of best-practice models through financial 
incentives and better information.
3. State licensing standards would allow individuals to move 
across state lines with minimal costs for retraining or 
residency requirements.
4. Certain occupations that are licensed would be reclassified 
to a system of certification or to no regulation. 
1. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS TO EVALUATE 
OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING 
State and local governments should require and perform 
cost-benefit analysis prior to approving any new occupational 
licensing requirements or the initial licensing of new 
occupations. The burden should be on the government 
together with the associations representing the occupation 
to demonstrate that the social benefits of these requirements 
exceed the economic costs. If the benefits to the public exceed 
the costs, governments and professional associations should 
also demonstrate that the proposed regulations are the least 
restrictive means of furthering the goals of the regulations.
As part of the qualitative cost-benefit analysis, state and local 
governments should also develop and execute a plan to evaluate 
existing occupational licensing requirements. This plan would 
include development or inclusion of commissions within 
their respective regulatory departments (or in the legislative 
auditor’s office) to systematically review state occupational 
licensing practices. An example of a high-functioning 
regulatory department that often evaluates occupational 
licensing is the Colorado Department of Regulatory Agencies 
(DORA). Founded in 1968, this nonpartisan department is 
responsible for conducting sunset reviews required by law 
that periodically evaluate the need for certain functions of 
government, including occupational regulation.8 In 1985 
DORA also became responsible for conducting sunrise 
reviews on all proposals to regulate previously unregulated 
occupations or professions. According to Lauren Larson, 
an official at DORA, the focus of the department is on 
“eliminating regulatory burden that does not add value for 
consumer protection.”9 With a 2012–13 fiscal year budget 
of about $23 million, DORA’s Division of Professions and 
Occupations plans to return funds to the state in fiscal year 
2015, as the fees they collect exceed the costs of the agency.10 
In part due to this scrutiny and cost-benefit analysis, as shown 
in table 2, Colorado ranks in the lowest quartile of states in the 
percentage of its workforce subject to occupational licensing 
(17.2%).
When an occupational group seeks new licensing or a change 
in licensing requirements, or when a regulatory commission 
conducts a review of existing licenses, the governing state 
body should conduct a rigorous analysis to determine 
whether licensing (or additional licensing) is justified. The 
inputs into that analysis could come from existing studies—
if they exist and are deemed to be rigorous—or from new 
analyses. I propose a set of questions that state agencies and 
the representatives of those occupations should consider 
and address in any such analysis, along with guidelines for 
evaluating the answers to the posed questions:
1. Are the current standards for occupational practice 
inadequate to protect the public?
Evaluation: If the regulatory commission finds the current 
standards to be adequate, then there is no need for further 
occupational regulation in the form of licensing. If the 
regulatory commission finds the current standards to be 
inadequate, advocates for the licensing of that occupation 
should specify the minimum requirements they think are 
appropriate for entry into the occupation, whether there 
is a state or national exam that should form the basis of 
entry, and whether the occupation should be affiliated with 
an association that would enact and enforce standards. 
In addition, the regulatory commission should determine 
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whether sufficient methods exist for dealing with unqualified 
practitioners within the occupation that may cause harm to 
the public. If the answer is found that sufficient methods do 
not exist, then advocates should convincingly explain to state 
agencies how and why additional licensing is preferable to 
enforcement of practitioner compliance through traditional 
judiciary procedures. 
2. Are there current state or local business, nonprofit, or 
industry institutions that can adequately protect consumers 
or clients?
Evaluation: If there are institutional arrangements through 
business associations and industry groups such as the Better 
Business Bureau, American Arbitration Association, or 
American Hospital Association that can deal with consumer 
complaints adequately, then there is no need for government 
remedies.
3. Why are the existing legal remedies inadequate to prevent 
or redress the kinds of harm that could result from no 
licensing? Can litigation through the state and local courts 
handle any potential issues such as harm to third parties 
that incompetent or unqualified practices might cause? 
Would spillovers from lack of regulation cause harm to 
the community? How can regulation be provided through 
an existing state agency or in conjunction with presently 
regulated practitioners without new legislation?
Evaluation: If current legal remedies are adequate, then there 
is no need for further occupational licensing. If the courts 
are crowded due to claims of fraud or incompetence against 
currently unlicensed individuals in the occupation, it is unclear 
that licensing would reduce court crowding, as courts currently 
adjudicate cases between licensed occupations. As discussed in 
box 3, one such case has reached the U.S. Supreme Court: North 
Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade 
Commission. 
4. What is the expected impact of the proposed licensing 
on the existing supply of practitioners? What percentage 
of current practitioners will be able to meet the proposed 
eligibility criteria? Will current practitioners be 
grandparented (allowed to work without meeting the new 
requirements), and if so, under what conditions?
Evaluation: If the supply of practitioners is expected to 
decline and to result in underserved communities or reduced 
access to the service for those in poverty, then licensing 
should not be approved unless health and safety issues 
dominate. Regulation that grandparents current practitioners 
is tantamount to acknowledging the absence of any significant 
health and safety issue because these previously unregulated 
individuals were apparently providing adequate services that 
did not harm the public.
5. To what extent will regulation or expansion of 
regulation increase the cost of goods or services provided by 
practitioners? If applicable, will members of the occupation 
have bonds posted for coverage of potential legal claims?
Evaluation: If the cost of services is expected to rise 
substantially, then any health and safety benefits arising from 
licensing should be balanced against the fewer services that 
will be provided to the public. If bonds are posted for licensed 
individuals, as in the case of mortgage brokers, the regulatory 
commission should present to the state legislature their likely 
impact on prices and on access to the service (Kleiner and 
Todd 2009). 
These questions should be posed by legislators; appropriate 
state agencies and the representatives of those occupations 
seeking to be licensed should do the analysis. If state and 
local governments were to undertake these proposals and if 
these proposals were likely to lead to reduced occupational 
licensing, available evidence suggests that employment in 
these occupations would grow and the wage premium from 
restricting competition would fall. The main fiscal cost on 
states would be from the loss of license fees for occupations that 
have been deregulated. However, fees from both occupational 
and business licenses are less than 2 percent of state revenues, 
on average, ranging from 3 percent in California, a heavy 
regulation state, to less than 1 percent in Kansas, one of the 
least regulated states (U.S. Census Bureau 2013). Federal Race 
to the Top dollars (see subsection 4.2), combined with higher 
income and payroll taxes due to higher employment and 
additional transactions, can partially or wholly replace the 
lost revenue stream.
2. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO PROMOTE BEST 
PRACTICES
While there are occupational licensing requirements at 
the federal level, it is state and local rules that have the 
broadest reach by far. Nevertheless, it might be difficult, 
either financially or administratively, for states to undertake 
cost-benefit analyses on their own. I therefore propose that 
the federal government establish an intergovernmental, 
interagency working group to evaluate and promote sound 
policies on occupational licensing. This working group would 
be similar to how the National Center for Education Statistics’ 
Interagency Working Group on Expanded Measures of 
Enrollment and Attainment sets out guidelines for state 
education and training measures.11 (This intergovernmental 
group has been instrumental recently in adding questions 
about occupational regulation to major government surveys, 
such as the Survey of Income and Program Participation and 
the Current Population Survey; these questions have been 
used in many of the studies noted earlier.)
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The proposed working group would have two primary tasks, 
combining moral suasion and financial incentives. First, it 
would develop and promote a set of best practices for many 
regulated occupations after reviewing existing studies and 
experiences across states. The group would also be responsible 
for updating this set of best practices as states begin and continue 
conducting rigorous cost-benefit analyses of their licensed 
occupations (see subsection 4.1). The federal government would 
encourage—but not mandate—states to adopt these particular 
types of occupational regulatory policies. Only states that want 
to reform their policies would comply; states that think they 
would benefit from licensing reform would have the greatest 
incentives to improve their policies.
The second mission of the working group would be to 
induce states to adopt the best-practice recommendations by 
encouraging states (or groups of states willing to cooperate) 
to compete for federal grants. Under this plan, states would 
be encouraged to submit proposals that outline specific steps 
they would take to reduce or modify unnecessary licenses 
or to revise licenses in specific occupations (e.g., dental 
hygiene, interior design, and cosmetology). This plan would 
also encourage states to undertake broader process reforms 
to include more nonpractitioners on licensing boards. Such 
reforms could include movement of occupations from 
governmental licensing to certification or to opening the 
regulatory process to additional stakeholders, including 
organized consumer groups such as AARP or the Consumers 
Union. A panel of experts in the topic, drawn from the 
intergovernmental, interagency working group described 
previously or those such a group designates, would review the 
plans and distribute a partial award to the groups with the 
most meritorious plans, withholding the remaining award 
until those groups have met certain progress benchmarks. It 
is important to note that the plan would not be a mandate and 
that only states that want to reform their policies would apply 
for the federal grants.
I propose that the Departments of Labor and Commerce take 
the lead in establishing the aforementioned working group. 
To ensure a variety of expertise in determining the set of best 
practices and evaluating proposals, however, I advocate the 
following agencies be included in this working group: 
• Because of their expertise in data analysis and policy, 
members of the Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (and perhaps their parent agencies, the Department 
of Commerce and the Department of Labor) could provide 
critiques of the methodology of the proposals. 
• The Department of Education could assist with determining 
the criteria in evaluating the state plans, since that agency 
has expertise from the Race to the Top project. 
• Individuals from the National Center for Science and 
Engineering Statistics (part of the National Science 
Foundation) and the Office of Statistical and Science Policy 
(part of the Office of Management and Budget) could 
provide input regarding the impact of the proposals on 
licensing of engineers and of health professionals as well as 
on national innovation and technological change. 
• Given their expertise in regulation and consumer 
protection, experts from the FTC could help the group 
select high-quality proposals. 
• Other groups and their cooperating partners, such as 
nonprofits from Common Cause or other nongovernmental 
consumer-oriented groups or universities, could offer 
comments and advice, as well as help evaluate and promote 
policies on occupational regulation to the state and local 
governments. 
• Groups including state- and local-level representatives, 
such as the National Conference of State Legislatures and 
the National Governors Association, could play a role in 
developing the set of best practices by highlighting states’ 
experiences.12 These groups could help facilitate cooperation 
if two or more states were to want to collaborate, either on 
their own terms or by applying for a federal grant together, 
on occupational licensing reform.
The creation of the group could occur either through 
Executive Order or through interagency cooperation. 
However, the financing for the federal grant process would 
be subject to congressional approval. Finally, information 
about the federal plan, both for promoting a set of best 
practices and for distributing grants, could be disseminated 
through a combination of government reports, popular press, 
and news items through social media. State- and local-level 
representatives in the working group could also help raise 
awareness and promote the set of best practices and federal 
grant process. 
Because these state proposals and reforms would not impose a 
substantial fiscal burden on states, the incentives do not have 
to be large, say $10 million per state, to have an effect on state 
take-up. The incentives from the Department of Education’s 
successful Race to the Top fund were $4.3 billion, which is 
smaller than even conservative estimates of the economic 
costs of licensing. The monetary incentives would be scalable, 
but importantly every dollar spent on those incentives is likely 
to generate more than a dollar in new economic activity: the 
plan will more than pay for itself. 
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3. STATE RECIPROCITY
When licensing is deemed to be in the public interest, weighed 
against the economic costs, states and localities should accept, 
as much as possible, licenses granted by other states. As noted 
earlier, since most occupations are licensed at the state level, 
licensure adds a potential barrier to migration across states 
for those in licensed professions because an individual must 
often fulfill new licensing requirements when migrating 
across state lines.13 However, licensing laws change often. In 
particular, state policies to accept licenses earned in other 
states (known as endorsement) and on forming agreements 
with other states on establishing mutually agreed licensing 
requirements (known as reciprocity) are constantly being 
amended. The Nurse Licensure Compact is one example: all 
states party to the Compact have agreed to accept nursing 
licensure applicants from the other party states without 
additional requirements. In the case of endorsement, a 
state will accept out-of-state applicants as long as the origin 
state has substantially equivalent licensure standards as the 
destination state. Licensed workers living in states that have 
reciprocity and/or endorsement policies with other states for 
their particular occupations have lower potential barriers 
to move to states in pursuit of a job than licensed workers 
living in states without such reciprocity policies. Indeed, 
recent empirical evidence on interstate migration shows that 
reciprocity provisions for occupations that are licensed do 
have important effects on whether individuals move across 
state lines (Johnson and Kleiner 2014).
Increased recognition of licenses across states would 
encourage workers to move to states where jobs are most 
plentiful and would be a net policy benefit for regulated 
workers and the consumers of their services. Of course, to 
the extent to which educational and other regulation-related 
requirements are harmonized, individuals would more 
readily move to take advantage of economic opportunities and 
wage differentials across states (Moretti 2012). This proposal 
could also help offset the long-standing decline in cross-state 
migration (Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl 2012). Nationwide 
endorsement through policies that do not limit entry 
requirements could alleviate uneven geographic distribution 
of licensed practitioners and ease possible location-specific 
mismatches (for example, the dearth of certain health-care 
practitioners in rural states). Targeting even just the ten states 
with the most mobility between them would go a long way 
toward solving the problem.14 More generally, expanding 
endorsement could greatly assist the economy by reducing 
structural unemployment and allowing licensed workers to 
maximize their incomes and productivity.
Encouraging states to accept each other’s licensed workers 
seems to be a simple procedure. States already universally 
accept other states’ driver’s licenses despite differences in 
requirements and road conditions among states. In that same 
spirit, states should more willingly accept others’ occupational 
licenses, especially if the relevant states have begun and are 
continuing to perform rigorous cost-benefit analyses, or if 
they are following the best-practice recommendations set 
forth by the aforementioned federal working group. 
Generally, states should want to accept each other’s licensed 
workers since it is in their best interest from both a revenue-
raising and a job-creating perspective. Moreover, the federal 
working group should include as part of its best-practice 
recommendations successful examples of reciprocity 
agreements among states. Including reciprocity agreements in 
the set of best practices would provide states with information 
about these agreements’ economic benefits and generate greater 
incentives to adopt such agreements, especially in the face of the 
federal grant process. Finally, one of the conditions for winning 
a federal grant for occupational licensing reform should be that 
states accept, as a default, licenses from other states who meet 
the standards set forth by the working group. In cases where 
a state does not want to accept other states’ licenses, it should 
be able to convincingly demonstrate that its requirements need 
to be stricter than those of other states as a result of unique 
conditions or qualities in that state.15 
Calls to reduce occupational licensing barriers to interstate 
mobility have come from the executive branch of the federal 
government, including the Departments of Defense and 
the Treasury (U.S. Department of the Treasury and U.S. 
Department of Defense 2012). The executive branch has made 
these policy recommendations because, due to variations in 
state licensing laws, the families of some military personnel 
have had a difficult time pursuing their careers, as the military 
moves personnel between states. The Department of Defense 
views this situation as creating a hardship on military families. 
The recognition of occupational licenses across states, similar 
to the existing recognition of commercial trucker licenses 
across states, would serve to help military families and other 
workers who are required to relocate due to a job for a spouse or 
other family member. Furthermore, expanding endorsement 
and reciprocity is more often supported by members of a 
profession than is deregulation, and thus is likely to be met 
with less political opposition.
Recognition of occupational licenses across states may not 
benefit all licensed workers equally. For example, the decision 
to move often depends on both age and education, with 
younger and more-educated workers often having the most 
to gain from migration. One would therefore expect that 
the higher the educational requirements for entry to a given 
licensed occupation, the more sensitive migration would be to 
agreements that reduce relicensure costs (Davies, Greenwood, 
and Li 2001; Sjaastad 1962).16 Since more-educated individuals 
often have greater opportunities to seek and obtain higher 
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returns on their investment in education, they would be 
more likely to move to obtain a better job or higher pay. The 
evidence in numerous empirical studies suggests that this is 
the case (Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak 2011).
4. CERTIFICATION POLICIES AS A SUBSTITUTE  
FOR LICENSING
The analysis of the benefits and costs of licensing may find that 
some occupations would benefit from lesser forms of regulation, 
such as certification or registration, or even no regulation. For 
example, services provided by locksmiths, ballroom dance 
instructors, interior designers, pet groomers, and auctioneers 
may not pose sufficient risk to health and safety to warrant the 
full regulation or right to practice of licensure. An additional 
policy would be to suggest that the state transfer occupations 
such as these from licensing to certification or other forms of 
regulation. One illustration of this approach is a bill proposed 
by the Minnesota Senate Commerce and Consumer Protection 
Committee that explicitly favors lighter regulation. The bill 
states, “No government shall require an occupational license, 
certification, registration, or other occupational regulation 
that imposes a substantial burden on the person unless the 
government demonstrates that it has a compelling interest 
in protecting against present and recognizable harm to the 
public health and safety.” Additionally, the bill favors the least 
intrusive form of regulation consistent with appropriate levels 
of health and safety: “If the individual meets the burden of 
proof . . . the government must then demonstrate by clear and 
convincing evidence that the government has a compelling 
interest in protecting against present and recognizable harm 
to the public health and safety, and [that] the regulation is 
the least restrictive means for furthering that compelling 
governmental interest.”17 Legislation covering similar issues 
has been introduced in the Utah legislature (Goldstein 2012).
The proposed Minnesota statute goes a long way toward 
favoring a policy of the least possible regulation of occupations 
by the government. It places the largest burden of proof on the 
state or local government to show that there are compelling 
health and safety issues that warrant licensure, and it allows 
the courts to determine whether anyone has been harmed by 
the absence of licenses. One possible drawback of the proposed 
licensing regulation in Minnesota would be increased litigation 
costs if unlicensed individuals who thought that they should 
be allowed to work in a licensed occupation were to engage 
the state in a significant number of lawsuits. However, these 
legal costs could be balanced by the reduction in the number 
of staff from regulatory agencies monitoring these workers. 
In addition, the reduced barriers to entry would stimulate 
competition and allow consumers to benefit from lower costs, 
which could increase the quantity of services demanded and 
boost tax revenues for those services that are taxed. Also, the 
disputes that currently occur between licensed occupations or 
licensed and unlicensed occupations that lead to court cases—
and the costs of adjudicating them—would be reduced.
To the extent that the research on occupational licensing has 
influenced policy, another illustration comes from Iowa. In 2013 
Governor Terry Branstad of Iowa vetoed a proposal to license 
four counseling occupations in the health sector (Iowa Board 
of Certification 2013). In his veto letter to the speaker of the 
Iowa House of Representatives, the governor both emphasized 
that certification in these cases is a well-functioning and cost-
effective method of regulation, and highlighted the economic 
costs of licenses. For example, he argued that by requiring 
a bachelor’s or master’s degree, licenses would bar future 
workers with perfectly adequate skill levels from entering these 
occupations (Iowa Board of Certification 2013).
Furthermore, in other states such as Michigan and Florida 
relevant legislative committees have passed bills to implement 
widespread licensing reform, but the full legislatures have 
not subsequently passed them. Michigan, however, has 
eliminated licenses for occupations with few workers, such 
as community planners and auctioneers. Many of the specific 
occupations that were targeted for deregulation, as well as 
other regulated occupations in the state, lobbied effectively 
against deregulation. Given the political difficulty to pass 
legislation that would move occupations from full licensing 
to certification, I also consider other potential options that do 
not require removing occupational licensure.
One policy option would be for state legislatures or regulatory 
agencies to grant private certifying organizations the authority 
to qualify individuals to do the work of licensed individuals. 
These unlicensed individuals would be required to post an 
appropriate job-specific bond, the amount for which would 
be determined by the state legislature or the administrative or 
regulatory agency overseeing the occupation (Schlomach 2014). 
The bond would be the equivalent of purchasing malpractice 
insurance against service providers’ potentially incompetent or 
unscrupulous behavior. The bond would provide the consumer 
some protection against shoddy service providers similar to that 
provided by mortgage brokers or contractors who carry bonds 
to protect and reassure customers. This process would provide 
a much lower cost to enter the occupation than the recurring 
education and testing requirements currently in force with 
occupational licensing. The state could impose a registration fee 
to recoup its costs for administering the process to include the 
private certifying organizations.
Individuals who are certified by a participating private 
certifying organization could engage lawfully in the 
occupation for which they are privately certified regardless of 
any occupational regulation enacted by the government. The 
government would not prohibit or impose a penalty, fine, or 
fee on them, and they could use the term “privately certified” 
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to describe credentials (or as part of a title or designation) and 
would be legally able to provide all the services of a licensed 
provider (Schlomach 2014).
This proposal would provide market-based competition to 
licensed workers and could diminish some of the limited access 
to services that results from having only the more restrictive 
process of occupational licensing. The public would be protected 
by the required bond, and the certifying organization would 
have an interest in educating and certifying individuals who 
would provide high-quality services to the public. Certifying 
organizations have an incentive to be perceived as high quality 
and reputable because they can then charge higher fees and 
tuition for attending their training programs. Microsoft 
and the CFA Institute (which grants the title of chartered 
financial analyst) are illustrations of organizations with high-
quality certification programs. Another example is ISACA, 
an independent, nonprofit association, that provides four 
different certifications for occupations related to information 
systems. Overall, recent analysis of certification programs 
shows that they can have positive economic returns for the 
workers (Gittleman, Klee, and Kleiner 2014).
ARGUMENTS AGAINST EASING LICENSING 
REQUIREMENTS
The main argument against relaxing occupational licensing 
is the extent to which health and safety standards might 
be compromised. Certainly there are potentially large 
consequences: for example, if an incompetent boilermaker 
were to install or repair a furnace in a large building, the 
furnace could catch fire, with disastrous results. To the extent 
that occupational licensing reduces the likelihood of such an 
event occurring, it is more likely that the benefits of licensing 
outweigh the costs. As illustrated earlier, however, many 
occupations that are currently licensed in some states are 
unlikely to present such dangers.
A secondary concern is the potential for losses in the quality of 
services if training and experience requirements were reduced. 
Although reducing licensing standards may in some cases 
reduce quality, studies have not found evidence in support of 
this theory, in part because quality is hard to measure and in 
part because licensing standards are not always closely tied to 
the ability to do the job. Nevertheless, even if quality were to fall 
for some services, it would need to be weighed against the lower 
prices—and greater access for lower-income consumers—
for which the economic evidence is far stronger. That is, if 
licensing results in higher prices that prevent some lower-
income consumers from purchasing the service at all, it may be 
worthwhile to relax licensing if the reduction in prices allows 
more consumers to access the service at a slightly lower quality. 
Finally, workers in low-income occupations, such as 
cosmetologists or manicurists, could see their earnings fall if 
licensing in their occupations were reduced. These potential 
losses to members of a previously licensed occupation should 
be balanced against the greater number of individuals who 
could enter the occupation due to diminished entry costs and 
thus increase their own earnings. Potential one-time payments 
to the incumbent licensed practitioners could compensate 
them, at least in part, for their loss. These payments could 
possibly take the form of rebated licensing fees and be paid 
for by the economic gains—and higher tax revenue—from the 
reduced licensing.
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Chapter 5. Questions and Concerns
ARE THERE LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM 
EXISTING TEMPORARY AND PROVISIONAL 
LICENSING PRACTICES, SUCH AS RECIPROCAL 
RELATIONSHIPS FOR VETERANS?
Numerous states, including Alabama, Iowa, and Texas, have 
passed laws allowing veterans to count their hours of military 
training toward their state licensing qualifications for several 
occupations, ranging from emergency medical technicians 
in health care to electricians and plumbers in construction. 
Thirty-four states waive the driving skills test for veterans 
with a record of safely operating vehicles similar to the trucks 
and buses for which a commercial driving license is required. 
To date there do not appear to be any negative consequences 
of using military training as a substitute for state licensing 
requirements (U.S. Executive Office of the President 2013). 
These initial results suggest that greater use of reciprocity-
based agreements and provisional licensing is unlikely to lead 
to a reduction in the quality of services provided.
ON WHICH AGENCIES OR GROUPS CAN STATE 
GOVERNMENTS RELY TO CONDUCT OBJECTIVE 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES?
All state governments contain agencies that are designed to 
be nonpartisan. For example, the Office of the Legislative 
Auditor in Minnesota analyzes policy issues and produces 
factual reports on them to the legislature, but  does not 
advocate specific policy choices. In Colorado, DORA serves 
as a model of a nonpolitical agency that provides advice on 
occupational licensing policy issues. At the federal level, the 
Government Accountability Office issues nonpartisan reports 
that are generally not considered to be politically motivated.18 
While the ultimate decision to regulate an occupation rests 
with the legislature and governor, experience suggests that 
the data and analyses generated by these nonpartisan agencies 
would carry substantial weight in the regulation decisions. 
WHY NOT CALL FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO 
SIMPLY REQUIRE THAT CERTAIN OCCUPATIONS NOT 
BE LICENSED?
The major Supreme Court case that established the right of 
states to grant licenses was Dent v. West Virginia in 1889. 
The decision established state law regarding physicians to 
protect the health, welfare, or safety of citizens. In contrast, 
the National Labor Relations Act (1935), which governs 
labor management relations, was passed at the federal level 
and preempts state laws in regulating private sector unions. 
The states view occupational regulation as their appropriate 
venue, and are not likely to give up their jurisdiction of this 
type of regulation. However, other nations as diverse as China 
and the United Kingdom have legislation at the national level 
governing the regulation of many occupations (Chi, Kleiner, 
and Qian 2014; Koumenta et al. 2014). In the United States, 
where the law and custom of federalism devolves licensing 
to the states, national legislation could hamper the ability of 
the states to craft laws that best fit their social and economic 
climate. Consequently, although national legislation on 
occupational regulation could harmonize licensing laws, it 
does not appear politically feasible or economically desirable 
for local interests to not be considered.
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Chapter 6. Conclusions
Occupational licensing has been one of the fastest-growing labor market institutions in the United States since World War II. Evidence from the economics 
literature suggests that it influences the allocation of labor and 
capital in critical areas of the economy such as health care, 
construction, and education, and has had an important impact 
on employment, wage determination, employee benefits, and 
prices. Some even suggest that occupational licensing dampens 
the rate of innovation within an occupation by setting fixed 
and in some cases arbitrary rules. There are broad implications 
for the well-being of Americans as a consequence of the uneven 
and haphazard development of occupational licensing and lack 
of consistency across states in the education and training of 
licensed individuals. The proposals in this paper have focused 
on developing a rational approach within contemporary 
political constraints that moves the U.S. labor market toward 
more-reasoned regulation of occupations.
Specifically, given the costs of occupational licensing to the 
economy and the inconsistency and variability of licensing 
across states, I am proposing four major policy changes to 
reduce the regulatory costs of occupational licensing.
First, I suggest that state and local governments require 
and perform cost-benefit analysis prior to approving new 
occupational licensing requirements. The burden should be on 
the government together with the associations representing 
the occupation in question to demonstrate that the social 
benefits of these requirements exceed the economic costs. If 
the benefits to the public exceed the costs, governments and 
the interest groups should also demonstrate that the proposed 
regulations are the least restrictive means of furthering the 
goals of the regulations.19 In addition, I propose that state and 
local governments develop and execute a plan for evaluating 
existing occupational licensing requirements. The evaluations 
should be based on existing studies or new analyses. When 
the costs of regulation are shown to exceed the benefits, the 
requirements should be modified or dropped.
Second, the federal government 
can take a lead role in establishing 
a set of best practices through an 
evaluation of policies that have 
been shown to work and that 
may provide greater employment 
growth and lower prices, while 
maintaining service quality. The 
federal government can also 
encourage states to reevaluate 
occupational regulation by 
providing grants similar to those 
in the Race to the Top education 
program; these grants would 
be paid for by the economic 
gains to the economy of greater 
deregulation. A consortium of 
individuals from a number of 
government agencies, similar 
to the current Working Group on Expanded Measures of 
Enrollment and Attainment, and private experts could be 
enlisted to evaluate the proposals.
Third, licensing standards should allow individuals to move 
across state lines with minimal retraining or residency 
requirements. When licensing is deemed to be in the interest 
of the public, weighed against the economic costs, states and 
localities should accept, as much as possible, licenses granted 
in other states. This proposal would facilitate mobility across 
states and would make it more difficult for special interests to 
When licensing is deemed to be in the  
interest of the public, weighed against the 
economic costs, states and localities  
should accept, as much as possible,  
licenses granted in other states.
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tighten regulations in order to increase their monopoly status 
in a given state. Adopting this proposal among the ten pairs of 
states with the most mobility between them would go a long 
way toward addressing the harmful impacts of licensing on 
individual’s migration decisions.
Fourth, where politically feasible, state governments should 
reclassify certain occupations that are licensed to a system 
of certification or no regulation. This could be accomplished 
either by deregulating licensed occupations and turning 
them into certified ones, or by creating competition from 
individuals who are certified by private organizations. These 
individuals would be able to work with licensed individuals if 
they have appropriate bonding to protect consumers against 
shoddy service (see Schlomach 2014).
The proposals noted in the paper would benefit many workers, 
including those who could forgo unnecessary requirements 
and long-term training and have greater opportunity to find 
work in states that have more-rapid employment growth 
and better-paying jobs. Consumers would benefit by having 
services at lower costs. Lower-income individuals, for whom 
training requirements and higher prices are especially 
burdensome, would likely be helped the most. Incumbent 
licensed workers in low-wage occupations, whose earnings 
might fall under a reduction in licensing, could receive one-
time payments to compensate them in part for their loss; these 
payments could be funded through the economic gains—and 
higher tax revenue—from reduced licensing.
Given the evidence on the economic costs and benefits of 
occupational licensing, a reduction in licensing restrictions—
achieved through the implementation of the four proposals 
I have put forward—would lead to employment growth in 
affected occupations and a reduction in prices. The loss of 
fee revenue from occupational licenses would be offset by 
taxes from higher employment and additional transactions. 
Replacing licensing with certification in certain occupations 
and providing more competition would in most cases result 
in substantial gains in economic growth and employment 
without measurable harm to consumers.
26  Reforming Occupational Licensing Policies
Chapter 7. Appendix
Harris Poll Interactive developed survey weights to compensate for variation in selection probabilities, differential response rates, and possible undercoverage 
of the sampling frame. The derivation of the sample weights 
focused primarily on matching the marginal distributions of 
the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey by sex, 
age, educational attainment, census region, urbanization, race, 
Hispanic ethnicity, employment status, and class of employer 
(private, government, etc.).
Harris derived the questions of the 2013 survey from a 2008 
Westat questionnaire that researchers at the Princeton Data 
Improvement Initiative at Princeton University used to assess 
the accuracy of self-reported occupational licensing and 
certification. The key questions were 11, 11a, and 12:
Question 11. Do you have a license or certification that is 
required by a federal, state, or local government agency to do 
your job?
YES .........................................................................1
NO ..........................................................................2
IN PROCESS/WORKING ON IT .....................3
Question 11a. Would someone who does not have a license or 
certificate be legally allowed to do your job?
YES .........................................................................1
NO ..........................................................................2
Question 12. Is everyone who does your job eventually 
required to have a license or certification by a federal, state, 
or local government agency?
YES .........................................................................1
NO ..........................................................................2
Those who answered question 11 in the affirmative were asked 
additional questions about the agency (federal, state, or local) 
that required their license or certificate, and the requirements 
they needed to satisfy, such as achieving a high school diploma 
or college degree, passing a test, demonstrating certain skills, 
or completing an internship or apprenticeship.
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Endnotes
1.  The District of Columbia is treated as a state throughout this paper 
because it has its own licensing and certifying regulations.
2.  For additional examples, see Carroll and Gaston (1981).
3.  A basic examination of the national costs of licensing could be developed 
as follows, yielding these numbers: Suppose that the entire 15 percent 
wage premium for licensing mentioned in the text is from market power 
(as opposed to greater productivity from enhanced human capital), and 
further assume that labor supply is perfectly elastic and the labor demand 
elasticity is 0.5 (Hamermesh 1993). The calculation is that approximately 
38 million licensed workers in the United States in 2010 (about 29 percent 
of the eligible workforce) multiplied by the .15 wage premium multiplied 
by the elasticity of 0.5 results in a loss of 2.85 million jobs. Furthermore, 
the average annual earnings of $41,000 / 1.15 = $35, 652 if there is no 
wage premium for licensing. Therefore, $41,000 – $35,652 = $5,348 is the 
economic rent for a licensed worker. Consequently, licensing results in an 
annual cost to consumers of $5,348 x 38 million which is approximately 
$203 billion.
4.  National Labor Relations Act 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1935); Dent v. West 
Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
5.  This value is lower than the 38 percent found by Kleiner and Krueger 
(2013) based on a 2008 Westat survey. The difference may reflect the 
larger sample size of the Harris data (the Harris sample was almost four 
times the size of the Westat sample), the sample selection criteria, or the 
method of data collection (phone survey versus an online survey). In 
addition, unlike the Westat sample the Harris poll did not use a validity 
check on the quality of the responses by occupation. The number of state-
level observations varies from 146 in Tennessee to 222 in the District of 
Columbia, and averages 193 per state.
6.   See Kleiner (2006, table 3.3) for a full listing of price effects of occupational 
licensing.
7.  North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade 
Commission N.C. 12-1172 (2014).
8.  Under Colorado’s sunset laws, many state functions and agencies are 
automatically terminated at a certain date unless the functions or agencies 
have been expressly reauthorized by the state legislature (Colorado 
Legislative Council n.d.).
9.  Telephone conversation with Lauren Larson, January 5, 2015.
10.  DORA’s budgetary structure, however, may provide incentives for greater 
regulation in order to generate additional state revenues.
11.  The current group consists of individuals from the U.S. Census Bureau, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Council of Economic Advisers, National 
Center for Education Statistics, National Center for Science and 
Engineering Statistics, National Science Foundation, Office of Statistical 
and Science Policy in the Office of Management and Budget, and Office 
of the Under Secretary of the Department of Education.
12.  Although state- and local-level representatives could play a significant 
role in developing and promoting the best-practice recommendations, 
it is important that these representatives be excluded from the panel of 
experts responsible for reviewing and selecting the grant plans.
13.  Although the key responsibility of licensing rests with the states in line 
with the Dent v. West Virginia (1889) case mentioned earlier, it is legally 
uncertain whether the federal interstate commerce or full faith and credit 
clauses in the Constitution relate to occupational licensing.
14.  Using public-use micro sample data from the 2000 Census, the ten state 
pairs with the most gross mobility between them from 1995 to 2000 were 
New York and Florida; New York and New Jersey; California and Nevada; 
California and Texas; California and Arizona; Florida and Georgia; 
California and Washington; California and Oregon; California and 
Colorado; and New Jersey and Pennsylvania (Perry 2003).
15.  For example, a licensed civil engineer moving to California would 
need to know earthquake faults and the state’s unique terrain for road 
construction approvals and examinations.
16.  This scenario would also be the case if wage differentials across states were 
greater for occupations requiring more education, which is consistent 
with observed patterns (Davies, Greenwood, and Li 2001).
17.  SF 380 87th Leg. (2011–12), sec. 1, subd. 2(b), 3(d)). https://www.revisor.
mn.gov/bin/bldbill.php?bill=S0380.1.html&session=ls87.
18.  With the growth in federal surveys that currently or will track 
occupational licensing issues, such as the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation, the Current Population Survey, and the National Survey of 
College Graduates (to take place in 2016), data gathering and analyzing 
information on the topic will continue to improve and so make objective, 
nonpartisan analysis more transparent.
19.  This proposal was introduced in the Minnesota State Legislature (2012) in 
a recent legislative session.
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Highlights
Morris M. Kleiner of the University of Minnesota offers four proposals with the goal of 
systematizing and harmonizing occupational licensing regulation. Together, these proposals 
would reduce the regulatory and economic costs of occupational licensing among states 
while increasing employment opportunities and expanding consumer access to services.
The Proposal
Cost-Benefit Analysis to Evaluate Occupational Licensing. State governments, 
together with the relevant occupational associations, would perform cost-benefit analysis 
on new and existing occupational licensing regulations. The analyses would rely on both 
new and existing studies. 
Federal Engagement to Promote Best Practices. The federal government would 
establish a federal interagency group to promote best practices in occupational regulation. 
States would also be encouraged to apply for federal grants for evaluating and improving 
their current system of occupational licensing. 
State Reciprocity. States would develop reciprocity agreements to more readily accept 
occupational licenses granted by other states with similar licensing requirements. 
Certification Policies as a Substitute for Licensing. When the costs of licensing exceed 
its benefits, states would consider transferring away from licensing to a lesser form of 
regulation, such as certification or registration, or even to no regulation.
Benefits
If state and local governments were to undertake these proposals to streamline occupational 
licensing, available evidence suggests that employment in these occupations would grow, 
the prices for services would fall, and access to services would increase, all while minimizing 
harm to public health and the economic well-being of certain regulated workers. These 
reforms would not be costless since states would lose revenue from licensing fees for 
occupations that are deregulated. Estimates suggest, however, that increases to income 
and payroll taxes from higher employment and more-frequent consumer transactions 
could partially or wholly replace the lost revenue stream. 
